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UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE IN ESTATE PLANNING AND
ADMINISTRATION: A MILD AND TEMPERATE DISSENT
CLARENCE F. HYRNE, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

Lawyers work at estate planning and estate administration. Laymen
sometimes want to work in these fields. Lawyers and laymen both know that
when such work is efficiently done it is remunerative. The result is that
some laymen and lay organizations actually do work at estate planning
and estate administration, raising the questions of unauthorized practice
which are the subject of this article.
Attempts to draw boundaries around the practice of law usually result
in blurred lines. It is clear to everyone that only persons admitted to practice
should represent clients in trials in courts of general jurisdiction. It is
equally clear that one who gratuitously prophesies the probable disposition
by a traffic court of his neighbor's speeding ticket is not practicing law. But
the real cases are harder. When a trust officer tells a prospective customer
that he needs a marital deduction provision in his will or trust agreement, or
when an insurance man tells a sales prospect that he will need $75,000 in cash
to cover his foreseeable probate costs and death taxes, the location of the
line is not so easy. The reason is that the line-drawer, whether court, legislator,
or legal essayist, is affected by two sometimes conflicting pressures. The overt,
avowed, ostensible motive is the protection of the public from the mountebank. The other not usually avowed motive is the inescapable economic
self-interest of the practitioner who defends from lay intrusion the professional turf upon which he gains his livelihood. To say this is not to traduce
the legal profession. Recognizing the unavoidable presence of self-interest
in the unauthorized practice cases is perfectly consistent with according merited
admiration, respect, and esteem to those who hold even the most traditional
and sometimes belligerent views on the subject of unauthorized practice.,
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo. A.B., 1959, LL.B., 1948, University
of Cincinnati; LL.M., 1953, University of Michigan.
1. Sometimes the mildest and most gentle-hearted of persons will be tempted by
zeal to defend his professional territory with uncharacteristic stridency. See, e.g., Green,
Unauthorized Practice as it Affects Public Relations, 28 Omo B. 686, 689-90 (1955) :
"In the first place, the majority of the 'bad mouthing' the legal profession receives
comes from the so-called lay specialists who want to practice law. Every place you
find someone who is illegally or improperly performing legal services, whether a little
or a lot, in connection with a business enterprise, you will find someone who depreciates
the lawyer.
"That goes for real estate men, accountants, notaries public, bankers, justices of the
peace, consultants, insurance adjusters, estate planners, undertakers, lumber dealers,
architects, trade associations, fortune tellers and even taxidermists, who feel they know
more about a particular phase of the law than any lawyer possibly could. This is true
whether they are doing it for a flat fee or in the promotion of the main purpose of
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Although the opinions stated in this article are sometimes at variance with
traditional attitudes, they are submitted with no intent to impugn the
character or assail the good faith of the large number of honorable lawyers
who will reject them.
This interplay of mixed motives has sometimes resulted in definitions of
the practice of law in terms so broad as to be meaningless. Some courts have
defined the practice of law as what lawyers do in serving their clients.2 In
suppressing unauthorized practice, this is scarcely more informative than defining burglary as what burglars do to their victims. The American Bar
Association's Code of Professional Responsibility does not even attempt to
define the practice of law.5 The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut has
defined the practice of law as the performance "of any acts . . . in or out of
court, commonly understood to be the practice of law." 4 The practice is thus
defined as not only what lawyers actually do, but also as anything else that
they are commonly understood to do.5 What these definitions lack in precision
they certainly make up for in infinite expandability. We all need to remind
their particular business. In the enumeration of the foregoing categories I did not mean
to overlook the collection agencies with their 'sweet-heart' arrangements with a few lawyers,
or the trust companies which maintain a stable of kept practitioners who ply their
trade for the enrichment of corporations."
2. Stern v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 245 Ind. 526, 535, 199 N.E.2d 850, 853 (1964)
(quoting with approval the definition of the practice of law to be found in 7 C.J.S. Attorney
and Client §3 (1937); In re Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 189, 65 S.E. 210, 211 (1909).
3. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 3-5. "It is neither necessary nor
desirable to attempt the formulation of a single, specific definition of what constitutes
the practice of law. Functionally, the practice of law relates to the rendition of services
for others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer. The essence of the professional judgment of the lawyer is his educated ability to relate the general body and
philosophy of law to a specific legal problem of a client; and thus, the public interest will
be better served if only lawyers are permitted to act in matters involving professional
judgment. Where this professional judgment is not involved, non-lawyers, such as court
clerks, police officers, abstractors, and many governmental employees, may engage in
occupations that require a special knowledge of law in certain areas. But the services of a
lawyer are essential in the public interest whenever the exercise of professional legal
judgment is required."
4. State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 234, 140 A.2d 863,
870 (1958) (quoting Grievance Comm. V. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 330, 22 A.2d 623, 626 (1941)).
5. The lack of persuasiveness in the court's attempt in State Bar Ass'n to delineate
the practice of law as those things "commonly understood to be the practice of law" did
not pass unnoticed. Id. A case comment accords grudging approval to the court's attempt
at definition:
"In overruling the lower tribunal, the court in the State Bar Ass'n of Conn. case appears
to have fallen in line with the recent trend towards a more restrictive view of the permissible scope of fiduciary activities by banks and trust companies. There may be those
who feel that the court, in restraining those acts 'commonly understood to be the practice
of law,' was involved in circular reasoning which shed little light in establishing an exact
standard of permissible and non-permissible activities. However, because there is a legal
flavor to almost every act of any business it would seem impossible for a court to propound
a definitive test which would satisfy every possible situation. The court took perhaps the
wisest course when it laid down the general rules pertaining to the unlawful practice of
law, and then attempted to decide no more than the narrow factual problems before it."
Comment, Attorney and Client- Bank and Trust Companies- Unlawful Practice of Law,
39 B.U.L. REv. 115, 119 (1959).
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ourselves, whether we are of bench, bar, or academe, that when we formulate
such definitions with a view toward giving more or less unlimited range to
unauthorized practice suppression measures, the lay public sometimes draws
skeptical conclusions about our actions. When it becomes necessary to
grapple with a particular instance of claimed unauthorized practice, courts
sometimes say that the practice of law consists in principal part of conducting
litigation, preparing documents, and advising clients.6 Consequently, the intrusion of the layman or the lay organization into any of these areas constitutes
7
the unauthorized practice of law.

As used here, "estate administration" means both the financial process of
collecting and safeguarding the property of a decedent, whether probate or
nonprobate, and the judicial process of subjecting it, to the extent required
by local law, to the jurisdiction of a probate court; settling claims to which
it is subject; paying taxes imposed upon it; distributing what is left to those
entitled under will, trust, or statute of descent and distribution; and securing
the final official approval of the court upon the whole. "Estate planning"
will be used to mean devising an arrangement, the "estate plan," for the
devolution of a person's wealth. The term "estate plan" is used to mean the
actual will, with or without related trust agreements, which after the decedent's death will be filed in the probate court. Sometimes the "estate plan"
is an essay, memorandum, or opinion summarizing the gist of the legal,
financial, and tax effects of a whole assemblage of dispositive documents. In
a large and complicated estate plan, these documents might include: (1) a
will; (2) one or more revocable trust agreements; (3) one or more irrevocable
trust agreements; (4) personal and group life insurance policies; (5) one
or more "buy-sell agreements," arrangements for the disposition by the estate
or a trust of corporate, partnership, or other business interests; and (6) one
or more pension or profit sharing plans. These items do not exhaust the
arsenal of the sophisticated estate planner.
SPECIFIC CATEGORIES
OF
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE

The Scrivener as UnauthorizedPractitioner
The cheekiest form of unauthorized estate planning is the actual production of the dispositive documents themselves by the lay practitioner for
Another commentator gave the decision a less credulous reception:

"By rejecting the majority position that corporate fiduciaries act primarily in their own
interest rather than for others, the instant case and the Arkansas Bar Ass'n decision represent
the most severe limitation yet placed on such corporations. The specific practices of the
banks declared in the instant case to be unauthorized, encompass virtually all fiduciary
services performed by a banking institution, and it is difficult to envision any similar
services which would not be 'commonly understood' to constitute the practice of law."
44 IowA L. REv. 617, 621 (1959) (footnotes omitted).
6. E.g., Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa 623, 631, 5 N.W.2d 914, 918 (1942); Grand
Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 63, 287 N.W. 377, 380 (1939).
7. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY, Canon 3, EC 3-1.
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specific "clients." It is also the easiest form for the profession and the courts
to handle.
Notaries, perhaps because of their official power to administer oaths, take
acknowledgments, and affix seals to documents recording such actions, seem
to acquire a certain confidence in their ability to draw and supervise the
execution of wills. One such notary prepared a will for a testator and had
it executed by adding a jurat and his own signature as notary.8 No other
witnesses were present at the time of the testator's signature, although the
notary subsequently obtained two additional persons to sign as "witnesses."
Of course, neither "witness" saw the testator sign nor heard the testator
acknowledge his signature." After the instrument was denied probate for lack
of proper attestation, the notary had the brass to upbraid an attorney who
pointed out the defective execution to him on the ground that everyone knew
that a will bearing a notarial seal was valid and did not need any
other witnesses. 10 The court held that the fact that the scrivener was engaged
in unauthorized practice was one element of culpability underlying his liability
to the plaintiff, a disappointed legatee under the abortive will." Another
notary with unconventional notions of will execution was a bank employee
accustomed to being asked to supervise the execution of wills. 1 2 His routine

also was to administer an oath to the testator, complete the jurat, and then
have a couple of tellers sign as witnesses without ever having actually seen
the testator sign.' 3 An alert court denied probate to such a will and berated
the notary and all others who undertake to ply a lawyer's craft without
knowing how to do it.'

4

A real estate broker advised a friend that she did not need a will but
could accomplish a postmortem transfer of real estate and cash by the present
execution of certain conveyances to be recorded after her death. That advice,
together with the drafting of the deeds and the supervision of their execution,
was held to be the unauthorized practice of law.' 5 In that case the unauthorized practitioner had not only supplied advice to the "client" but had
produced and supervised the execution on instruments intended to carry
the plan into effect.1 6
8. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 648, 320 P.2d 16, 17 (1958).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11.
12.

Id. at 650-51, 320 P.2d at 19.
In re Flynn's Estate, 142 Misc. 7, 8-9, 253 N.Y.S. 638, 639-40 (Sup. Ct. 1931).

13. Id.
14. Id. For other instances in which over-confident notaries have miscarried, see
People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919); Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A.

883 (1934); Grievance Comm. v. Coryell, 190 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Ct. App. 1945).
15. People ex rel. Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. Schaefer, 404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E.2d 773 (1949).
16.

Id. The plan was for the decedent to execute a deed conveying her property to a

straw man who would then reconvey the title to the decedent and her daughter as joint
tenants with right of survivorship. The decedent was also instructed to sign a note to
her son as payee for $500. The daughter was to pay the note after the decedent's death,
whereupon the son was then to sign a quitclaim deed for any interest he might hold in
the property and deliver it to the daughter. The scheme went awry when the son refused
to sign the quitclaim deed. Interestingly, the defendant, responding to the information

brought by the bar association, appeared pro se.
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In advertising his wares, an insurance broker included "Wills-MortgagesSecretarial-Notary Public-Bookkeeping-Public Auditor-Income Taxes." 17 He
came to grief by his belief that a jurat on a will can properly substitute for
witnesses. 18 Practitioners of other occupations have shown a propensity for
drawing wills and other dispositive documents for the public and have uniformly been condemned, convicted, enjoined, or held in contempt by the
courts. Among them are public stenographers, 9 bank cashiers, 20 suspended
attorneys or attorneys not locally admitted to practice,2 1 lay court functionaries, 22 realtors, 23 and even law clerks. 24 There has been some wobbling
on the question of the propriety of a bank's salaried attorneys preparing dispositive documents. 25 Generally, however, courts have not wavered in the
view that drawing wills and trust agreements is the exclusive domain of
persons admitted to the practice of law. In this class of cases the unauthorized
practitioner usually stands convicted by his own ignorance and ineptitude,
and the courts are faced with no legal complexities in visiting retribution
on him. The rationale of the courts most often is as plain as a pikestaff and
needs little or no analysis or comment.
The Counseloras UnauthorizedPractitioner
In Oregon State Bar v. John H. Miller & Co. 26 the court was faced with
the question of whether the preparation of expository estate plans, those not
consisting of actual dispositive documents, by a person claiming no legal
expertise beyond that involved in discussion of the application of the tax laws
and the estimation of cash requirements of decedents' estates was enjoinable
as the unauthorized practice of law. Joining the Oregon State Bar, which
brought the action, the members of the Unauthorized Practice Committee
of the American Bar Association and a party described as "Advanced Life
Underwriting" filed amicus curiae briefs.27 The individual respondent, the insurance broker, and his corporation did engage in the business of preparing
estate plans for the persons whom they approached, solicited, and served, either
as an incident to selling insurance or for a fee apart from the sale of any insurance.2 The actual estate plan took the form of suggestions to the customer,
ostensibly to serve as the basis for a conference with his attorney whom he was
17. State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass'n v. Osborne, 241 Ind. 275, 172 N.E.2d 434 (1961).
18.

Id.

19. People ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Hanna, 127 Colo. 481, 258 P2d 492 (1953).
20. People ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Woodall, 128 Colo. 563, 265 P.2d 232 (1954).
21. Florida Bar v. Larkin, 298 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1974); State ex rel. Neb. State Bar
Ass'n v. Butterfield, 172 Neb. 645, 111 N.W.2d 543 (1961); Application of Christianson, 215
N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1974).
22. In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951); In re Graham, 1 Monroe Legal Rep.

89, 80 Pa. D.&C. 531 (1937).
23. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957);
Drew's Estate, 32 Pa. D.&C. 297 (1938).
24. Ferris v. Snively, 172 Wash. 167, 19 P.2d 942 (1933).

25. See notes 53-67 infra and accompanying text.
26. 235 Ore. 341, 385 P.2d 181 (1963).
27. Id. at 342, 385 P.2d at 181.

28. Id. at 343, 385 P.2d at 182.
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urged to consult. 29 The suggestions concerned the use of gifts, the marital deduction, inter vivos and testamentary trusts, and other devices designed to
minimize taxes. The trial court issued an injunction, which in effect left the
respondents free to do what is usually considered the activity of selling insurance, including advising the customer how much cash he may need to
meet the requirements of death taxes. 30 The court forbade the respondents to
make any other statements to the customer about the tax consequences of his
death. The Supreme Court of Oregon thought that even small amounts of leeway allowed to lay persons were excessive and commanded the respondents
to cease preparing estate plans embodying legal analysisA1 Even recognizing
the eminence and experience of those members of the American Bar Association and Oregon State Bar Association who brought the suit, along with
their unquestioned good faith and professional spirit, sane and reasonable
men can still dissent from the result and skimpy reasoning of the decision. A
32
dissenting view is included in the portion of this article dealing with rationale.
Stockbrokers and mutual fund salesmen have sometimes fallen afoul of the
unauthorized practice committees for the same reason that insurance men
and trust companies have done so. Their communication of certain home
truths about the differing tax consequences of alternative courses of financial
conduct sometimes makes the customer or potential customer more willing
to purchase their wares. In an illustrative case, Raymond, James and Associates,
Inc., a securities broker, passed the word among its customers that death taxes
could be reduced by using trusts, joint ownership of property, ancillary administration, and similar estate planning concepts that might interest the
well-to-do retiree living in Florida. It may also be surmised that the stockbroker
offered estate analysis services, which probably included information about
modern estate planning devices. 3 The activities were held to constitute the
unauthorized practice of law, and the company was enjoined from performing

29.

Id. at 344, 385 P.2d at 182.

30. Id. at 345-46, 385 P.2d at 183.
31. The court said:
"The life insurance needs of the client can be determined only in relation to the
client's estate as a whole. Whether life insurance is preferable to some other method of
distributing the assets of the estate calls for an appraisal requiring an understanding
of relevant legal principles. An insurance salesman can explain to his prospective customer
alternative methods of disposing of assets, including life insurance, which are available
to taxpayers generally. He may inform his prospect in general terms that life insurance
may be an effective means of minimizing his taxes. He cannot properly advise a prospective
purchaser with respect to his specific need for life insurance as against some other form
of disposition of his estate, unless the advice can be given without drawing upon the
law to explain the basis for making the choice of alternatives." Id. at 346-47, 385 P.2d at
183-84 (footnotes omitted).
"The decree of the lower court can be construed to permit this type of advice. To
eliminate the ambiguity the following decree is substituted for that entered by the lower
court. Defendants are enjoined from preparing estate plans embodying legal analysis either
as a separate service or as an incident to carrying on the business of selling insurance." Id.
(emphasis added).
32. See text accompanying notes 68-95 infra.
33. In re The Florida Bar, 215 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla. 1968).
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any of them. 3 4 The court's order did permit the company to complete the
ordinary forms incident to the purchase and sale of securities, to complete
forms relating to Keogh plans if supplied and presumably drafted by institutional trustees and custodians, to furnish information to and assist their
customers' attorneys, and to furnish information concerning federal and state
tax matters, provided the information had no discernible bearing on the
property or tax liability of the particular customer.3 5 In this case, as in
the Miller case,38 the injunction was issued solely on the ground that the
respondent had discussed tax and financial consequences of various estate
arrangements with his customers. Whether the advice was right or wrong
and whether the result of the consultations was a net benefit to the customer
were deemed unimportant. It was enough that the respondent had broken
the close.
The Author as UnauthorizedPractitioner
Legal stationers selling legal forms are patronized principally by the legal
profession, but their forms also are available for purchase by the lay public
to be put to any use the purchaser has in mind. Form books are available by
the hundreds and no prescription is needed to buy them. Are the authors,
publishers, and sellers of legal forms engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law? No one supposes that they are. But the addition of only a little extra
in the way of personal service can put the publisher over the line and into
the forbidden area. What is ostensibly the mere publication of a how-to-do-it
book or pamphlet on drawing wills or administering estates may be in fact
an advertising come-on scheme that offers the services of the lay publisher
to the public in an area of unauthorized practice. Courts have by one device
or another shown a readiness to put a stop to the unauthorized practice
7
part of this operation.
34. Id. at 613-14.
35. Id. at 614-15.
36. See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
37. See, e.g., Shortz v. Yetter, 33 Luzerne Legal Reg. Rep. 489, 38 Pa. D.&C. 291 (1940).
Here the lay publisher was putting out a pamphlet called "A Practical Aid for Executors
or Administrators of Decedents' Estates." However, he did not content himself with that
maneuver but went on to hold himself out as ready and willing to render services and
give advice on the subjects of preparing wills or administering estates. In this context
the court put an end to the whole operation, although the distinction between publishing
and advising was not as clear as it became in the Dacey cases. See notes 39-52 infra and
accompanying text. The text of the final decree seems to show that the court recognized
some differences between, on the one hand, publishing a written statement of the writer's
view of what the law is or should be and, on the other hand, "printing and publishing
questions and answers involving expert or professional legal knowledge." Id. at 496, 38 Pa.
D.&:C. at 300.
In New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, 256 App. Div. 674, 11 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1939), the
lay author and publisher put out a pamphlet, "How to make your Last Will and Testament
secretly without other legal aid," and in connection with the publication solicited readers
to send in pencil drafts of their wills which then would be typed up by "members of the
bar (lawyers experienced in the making of wills)." Id. The entrepreneurs went out of
business at the same time that the show cause order was served, so the court found it
unnecessary even to issue an injunction. Id. at 675, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
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Consider the celebrated Norman F. Dacey and his book, How to Avoid
Probate!3s Panic gripped the legal profession when Dacey's book caught
the popular fancy. Lawyers feared that the book offered the public a way
of striking a blow at lawyers and saving a few dollars besides. Perhaps some
lawyers did not know or did not stop to reflect that the use of a funded
revocable trust to reduce the executor's commissions and attorney's fees incident to the probate process was, at the date of publication, a familiar device
that had been used by lawyers and corporate fiduciaries for decades.
The New York County Lawyers' Association launched an attack on Dacey
and his covey of publishers and booksellers, Crown Publishers, Inc., Doubleday & Co., Inc. and Brentano's, Inc., to have them all held in criminal contempt and enjoined from practicing law. The Supreme Court of New York
permitted itself to be hustled into a holding that Dacey, by writing, publishing,
and selling his book, was practicing law and could be held in contempt.3 9
The court enjoined the ordinarily injunction-proof booksellers from publishing.40 To sustain its position that publishers of pernicious books may not
hide behind the first amendment, under which Dacey claimed protection, the
court pointed to Ginzburg v. United States,41 in which the Supreme Court of
the United States had failed to uphold the right to publish the book EROS
because of its unprotected pornographic content. 42 The appellate division
somewhat more temperately affirmed the judgment with the modification
that only the publishers, and not Dacey himself, were enjoined from publication and sale of How to Avoid Probate! or any form of it that induced lay
persons to rely on Dacey's legal advice. 43 Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter,
put his finger on why the publication and sale of Dacey's book, even from
the most traditional point of view, was not the practice of law by pointing
out that there was no actual or pretended attorney-client relationship. 44 The
book consisted merely of text relating to the law of wills, trusts, and probate
and a number of forms of wills and trusts purportedly designed to accomplish
certain specific purposes, together with directions for their use. The only
real difference between it and the form books in any law library was that
Dacey's book was designed to be used by the lay public. The inescapable good
sense of Justice Stevens' analysis persuaded the court of appeals, which
reversed the judgment of the appellate division and dismissed the petition of
the New York County Lawyers' Association. 45 The issue was apparently so
46
clear to the court of appeals that it did not even write an opinion. Yet
38.

N.

DACEY,

How TO AVOID PROBATEI (1965).

39. New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 54 Misc. 2d 564, 282 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd, 28 App. Div. 2d 161. 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, rev'd, 21 N.Y.2d 694, 234 N.E.2d 459 (1967).
40. Id.
41. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
42. 54 Misc. 2d at 574, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
43. 28 App. Div. 2d at 161, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
44. Id. at 171-77, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 996-1001 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. 21 N.Y.2d at 694, 234 N.E.2d at 459.
46. The decision of the court of appeals in Dacey did not escape adverse criticism
from the conservative side of the law review choir. For an argument that the court of
appeals inadequately assessed the danger posed to the public weal by Dacey's shenaningans,
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two eminent courts below had been willing to go to the unseemly length of
enjoining the publication and sale of books in a nation where freedom of
the press gets at least lip service as one of our most vital public interests.
When the New York County Lawyers' Association commenced its proceedings against Dacey, he countered with an action in federal court to restrain the Association from pursuing him and to hold it liable for damages.47
His theory was that the embattled lawyers were depriving him of his rights
of free speech and press for which he was entitled to appropriate statutory
remedies. 48 When Dacey achieved his victory in the Court of Appeals of New
York so that injunctive relief was no longer necessary, he continued the
federal court action for damages. The district court denied him relief on
the ground that because of its quasi-prosecutorial role in the pursuit of Dacey,
the lawyers' association enjoyed the same absolute immunity from suit as a
prosecutor. Alternatively, if the Association did not have such immunity, then
any remedy in the nature of malicious prosecution under section 1983 was
barred because Dacey could not show that the Association lacked probable
cause in taking up the cudgels against him.4 9 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit rejected the Association's contentions on the issue of immunity
but decided that the Association did have probable cause to proceed against
Dacey. 50 The probable cause was shown by the fact that the Supreme Court
of New York had initially enjoined Dacey and his cohorts; even though the
merits were ultimately decided in Dacey's favor.5
see Case Note, Legal Profession-Publication of a Book on Estate Planning with Blank
Forms for Wills and Trusts Providing Only General Information Is Not Unauthorized
Practice, 46 TEx. L. REv. 989 (1968). The author argued that Dacey made sweeping statements in his book that his forms could be used by his customers with assurance they would
accomplish his predicted effect, although essential elements of estate planning, such as
community property, were left undiscussed. It was further argued, however, that the long
range professional remedy against those of Dacey's sort is not the frontal assault of unauthorized practice prosecutions, but rather the improvement in providing legal service
to the public by reducing legal fees through improved lawyer efficiency, making group
services plans available, and permitting telephone directory listing of legal specialties.
47. Dacey v. New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, 290 F. Supp. 835 (S.D. N.Y. 1968), af'd,
423 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 598 U.S. 929 (1970).
48. 290 F. Supp. at 838. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970) states: "Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
49. 290 F. Supp. at 842. Case Note, Malicious Prosecution: Bar Associations Immunity,
6 WAKE FoEsr INTrA. L. REv. 176 (1969), argued that the district court strayed from the
true faith on the immunity issue. The writer pointed out that in view of the first amendment freedoms involved, a court is il-advised to use the doctrine of quasi-prosecutorial
immunity to deny a suitor the right even to raise the issue of the defendant's absence of
probable cause to proceed against the plaintiff in the alleged malicious prosecution action.
Id. at 180.
50. 423 F.2d at 192-95. For documented applause of the court's rejection of the Association's claimed immunity from suit, see Case Note, Civil Rights -Judicial Immunity, 48 TEX.
L. R v. 946, 94849 (1970).
51. See text accompanying notes 59-46 supra.
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Dacey did not fare so well in Connecticut, where his activities were not
exclusively literary. In the Connecticut phase of his operations he gave his
prospects a text and form book dealing with wills and trusts. If the prospect's
interest was aroused, he was invited to tell Dacey how he wanted his property
to descend after his death. Dacey then showed the customer executed copies
of wills and trusts, which were either reproductions of the forms in the
book or such variations on them as Dacey thought best. Dacey supervised
the execution of the wills and trusts and orally supplemented the advice
in his book with information on the tax consequences of the instruments.
Dacey therefore not only discussed the effect of property and tax law on the
property of his prospect but also produced the instruments constituting the
arrangement for the devolution of his customer's property. The court held
this procedure to be the practice of law.52 No American court would do otherwise.
The CorporateFiduciary
as UnauthorizedPractitioner
The Huntington National Bank of Columbus, Ohio, operated an estate
analysis program that included discussions with potential customers about
their specific property, the application to their specific estates of tax laws and
laws concerning devolution of property, and other estate planning devices
available to them. All discussions included admonitions to the customers to
consult their own attorneys before taking any steps to carry out their desires
concerning disposition of their estates.5 3 The Ohio supreme court concluded
that these activities constituted the unauthorized practice of law. The court
held that even though an abstract discussion of the law, including presumably the furnishing of examples of the law's operation, does not amount
to practice, the furnishing by laymen and corporations of information about
what the customer really wants to know - "What's in it for me?" - is forbidden. 54 The Huntington Bank reminded the court of its relatively liberal
decision to trust companies in Judd v. City Trust & Savings Bank,5 5 in which
it had held that although trust companies could not offer legal services
through their attorney-employees to members of the public or even to their
own beneficiaries, they might nevertheless draft probate court documents
and make appearances in the probate court incident to the administration of
estates and trusts of which they were fiduciaries5 6 The court in Huntington
Bank held that the rule of the Judd case did not permit the giving of legal
or tax advice to customers or potential customers even when the people giving
the advice were attorney-employees and even when the advice was coupled
with the further instruction that the customers ask their own lawyers to
52. Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 222 A.2d 339 (1966), appeal dismissed,
386 U.S. 683, rehearing denied, 387 U.S. 938 (1967).
53. Green v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 4 Ohio St. 2d 78, 80, 212 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1965).
54. Id. at 84, 212 N.E.2d at 589.
55. 133 Ohio St. 2d 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937).
56. 133 Ohio St. 2d at 84, 12 N.E.2d at 291.
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carry out the recommended estate plans. 57 The bank bluntly suggested that
the central problem in this instance of claimed unauthorized practice was
not solicitude for the public in danger of being preyed upon by charlatans
pretending to be lawyers, but rather the perception of economic threat to the
legal profession in losing its monopoly over estate planning to the lay business
world. Far from being an economic threat, the bank argued that its soliciting
and advertising efforts directed at the public resulted in lawyers getting
clients they might not otherwise have had. If not for the educational function
of the bank, it argued, such persons might have dawdled their way to an
intestate death,8 The court neither overruled the Judd case nor denied the
force of the economic argument made by the bank, but it held that neither
of these considerations justified the bank's engaging in the practice of law.59
The bank also suggested, equally bluntly, that its own trust officers were more
expert in tax and estate matters than the attorneys in private practice to
whom they sent their customers, and therefore, that the court, by stilling the
bank's voice, was inflicting a net detriment on the public. The court, however,
believed that the expertise of the trust department could be made available
directly to the members of the practicing bar who actually consult with the
public without the members of the trust department engaging in unauthorized
practice. 0
The rigidly negative position taken by the court in the Huntington Bank
case with respect to the advising of customers by attorney-employees has been
duplicated in cases involving the drafting of dispositive documents. There
seems to be little judicial dissent from the view that the drafting of wills,
testamentary trusts, and inter vivos trusts is a task reserved by its nature to
attorneys who are engaged in private practice and who are not full-time
salaried employees of trust companies. 61 Only as to simple, nondispositive
57. Id. at 86-88, 12 N.E.2d at 293-94.
58. Id. at 84, 12 N.E.2d at 291.
59. 4 Ohio St. at 81-83, 212 N.E.2d at 587-88.
60. Id. at 82-83, 212 N.E.2d at 588:

"There is at least a suggestion in defendant's brief that defendant is more qualified
than the general lawyer to provide the legal advice necessary to reach sound conclusions
with respect to estate planning and that there is therefore a public interest in making
such legal advice from defendant available to its prospective customers. There is nothing
to prevent such a customer from getting any benefit he would have gotten from such
advice if the defendant is enjoined from giving it to prospective customers. The lawyer
of a prospective customer will undoubtedly welcome the helpfulness of defendant in developing an estate plan in which defendant is to, be a fiduciary.
"In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
should be modified so as to avoid any interference with full discussion by the defendant
with counsel for a client, who is a customer or prospective customer of the bank, of
any and all legal problems that may be involved in the planning or administration of
such client's estate."
61. Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954);
In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 P. 157 (1930); Frazee v. Citizens
Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965); Hobson v. Kentucky Trust Co., 303
Ky. 493, 197 S.W.2d 454 (1946); Detroit Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich.
216, 276 N.W. 365 (1937); State ex rel. Miller v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo.
845, 74 SAV.2d 348 (1934); People v. Peoples Trust Co., 180 App. Div. 494, 167 N.Y.S. 767
(1917); Judd v. City Trust & Say. Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937).
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documents, and then only in special circumstances, have a few courts relaxed
the general rule against drafting by any person other than attorneys engaged
in private practice.

6

2

Many courts have forbidden or looked with disfavor on salaried employees
of trust departments making even routine probate court appearances on
behalf of trust companies acting as fiduciaries of estates. 63 Others have permitted routine court appearances by attorney-trust officers that did not amount
to the conduct of litigation and were of the consultative sort characteristic
of probate practice.6 4 No one objects to the personnel of the trust department performing the hellish drudgery involved in the preparation of probate
court inventories and accounts. 65 On the other hand, as to court documents
whose composition is more demanding, such as miscellaneous motions, applications, and judgment entries, the attitudes of the courts have been mixed.6 3
62. Merrick v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 625 (1940); Detroit Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216, 276
N.W. 365 (1937); Judd v. City Trust 8c Say. Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E. 288 (1937).
63. E.g., State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank &. Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d
863 (1958); Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965); Hobson
v. Kentucky Trust Co., 303 Ky. 493, 197 S.W.2d 454 (1946); In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254,
232 N.W. 318 (1930).
64. Judd v. City Trust & Sav. Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 89-94, 12 N.E.2d 288, 292-94 (1937):
"The second question for decision is as follows:
"When state banks in Ohio, having trust powers, have been appointed fiduciaries and
are acting as such, and have duly admitted attorneys at law in their regular employ on a
salary basis, and those attorneys draft legal papers incident to the administration of the
trusts and appear in the Probate Court and other courts for and on behalf of the banks
as such fiduciaries, are the banks engaged in the unauthorized practice of law?
"This question presents a more difficult and complex problem.
"As previously noted, trust companies are empowered by law to act as fiduciaries. Such
right is not disputed. In performing the legal phases of that business, attorney-employees
are acting for their employers. They are engaged in an occupation directly connected
with their employers' authorized undertaking. They are not acting for others, except as
others may be incidentally affected. The trust company is then doing its own recognized
business through lawyers of its own selection. Whether they are salaried employees within
the organization, or outside lawyers receiving a fee for their services, is therefore not
important in such a situation. See Hanson v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 63 S.D. 622,
628, 262 N.W. 228, 231; /'s re Kelsey, 186 App. Div. 95, 100, 173 N.Y.S. 860, 863, 37
N.Y.Cr.R. 299.
"We are therefore constrained to answer the second question asked in the negative."
See also Merrick v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940); Detroit Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216,
276 N.W. 365 (1937).
65. Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954); State
Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958); Detroit
Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216, 276 N.W. 365 (1937); Judd v.
City Trust & Sav. Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937).
66. The court in Judd v. City Trust & Say. Bank, 133 Ohio St. at 91, 12 N.E.2d at 293,
expressly recognized the propriety of the preparation of such documents by attorneyemployees of trust companies. The same view was expressed in the court's denial of rehearing in Detroit Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. at 709-11, 281 N.W.
at 434-35, approving preparation by lay employees as long as the papers are filed under
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The preparation of tax returns incident to the administration of decedents'
estates and the audit of routine issues thereby raised have been deemed not
67
inappropriate for lay performance.
RATiONALE

In both the Code of Professional Responsibility and the courts, the legal
profession has stated its reasons for supporting the exclusionary rules of unauthorized practice. The reasons are usually couched in terms of imperative
demands of the public interest. The reasons stated in the ethical considerations
supporting Canon 3,68 reduced to the kernels, are these: (1) Only lawyers,
have the knowledge and skill needed to perform a lawyer's function; (2) Be69
cause only lawyers are bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility
and any other ethical observances enforced by the local courts or the profession, only they have the kind and degree of integrity required for serving
clients; (3) The attorney-client privilege affords the only effective assurance
to a client that his secrets will not be forcibly exposed, and the lawyer's duty
to preserve confidences under Canon 4 affords the only effective assurance that
secrets will not be betrayed voluntarily; and (4) Only lawyers are subject to
regulation of their professional conduct by the courts and the legal profession
and to the disciplinary measures of reprimand, suspension, and disbarment.
Particularly in the unauthorized practice cases involving trust companies,
the courts have relied on the axiomatically inherent disability of a business
corporation to engage in the practice of law. The disability is said to be
grounded in all of the considerations stated or implied in Canon 3 and
summarized above and also on further considerations that: (5) The salaried
the name and authority of one "licensed to practice law." The court did not specify
whether the sponsoring attorney had to be engaged in private practice or could be a
salaried employee of a trust company. In State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.,
145 Conn. at 235-37, 140 A.2d at 871, the court took the inconclusive position that the

drafting of such papers did not necessarily constitute the practice of law, but that the
filing of such papers required to be the subject of a hearing was the practice of law, and
that the corporate fiduciary was required to be represented in court by an attorney other
than one in its salaried employ. In Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark.
at 55, 57, 273 S.W.2d at 411-12, the court took the stern position of prohibiting even the
drafting, let alone the filing, of any probate court documents other than inventories and
accounts.
67. State Bar Assn v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958);
Groninger v. Fletcher Trust Co., 220 Ind. 202, 41 N.E.2d 140 (1942).
68. ABA CANONS OF PROFES IONAL ETHics No. 3, A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing
the Unauthorized Practice of Law.
69. Actually, the Code of Professional Responsibility is not self-enforcing and serves
only as a model and recommendation to the various state bodies of competent jurisdiction
in the matter of ethical conduct of lawyers. See Justice Department Charges Code Advertising
Provisions Violate Federal Antitrust Laws, 62 A.B.A.J. 979 (1976). For an example of the
local adoption of the Code, see Rule IV, Ohio Supreme Court Rules for the Government

of the Bar: "(1) The Code of Professional Responsibility, as adopted by this Court on
October 5, 1970, and set forth in 23 Ohio State 2d Reports, shall be binding upon all
persons admitted to practice law in the State of Ohio, and the willful breach thereof shall
be punished by reprimand, suspension or disbarment, as provided in Rule V of the Supreme
Court Rules for Government of the Bar of Ohio."
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or even fee-compensated attorneys or lay persons through whom a corporation
would have to render its legal services would not be able to give their undivided loyalty to the recipient of the services because of the corporate
employer's financial grip on the employee actually dealing with the "client;" 7°
and (6) A business corporation is or may be owned and managed by laymen
whose assumed predominant motive is making money, whereas the assumed
predominant motive of an attorney in private is assisting in the administration of justice. 71
Fair minded people ought to and will cheerfully concede that these arguments are made in good faith. They seek to defend the exclusive franchise
of members of a profession with a centuries old honorable tradition and with
a truly illustrious past - a tradition that has been one of the chief formative
components of the free world's way of life and system of government. To
concede this, however, is not to concede that there is nothing to be said
on the other side.
No one is likely to dispute the fact that lawyers know more than nonlawyers about the sufficiency of a pleading, the questioning of jurors on voir
dire, and the manner of securing review of a trial court judgment in an
appellate court. Learning that is truly unique to lawyers is immense in area
and complexity. Candor compels the admission, however, that the content,
application, and effect of federal tax laws is a sphere of learning that lawyers
share with nonlawyers. The Tax Court of the United States has recognized this
fact by opening practice in that court to any citizen of the United States of
good moral character and repute, lawyer or nonlawyer, who has in any way
learned enough tax law and procedure to pass the court's examination.72
Litigation may be conducted by nonlawyers in this specialized court. It is
generally recognized that many lawyers who do not specialize in tax matters,
as compared to many accountants, have only a nodding acquaintance with
the real complexities of tax law and practice. Therefore, in tax matters, the
one area of supreme importance to estate planning and estate administration,
lawyers cannot conscientiously lay claim to a group monopoly of the lore
or even necessarily to a group superiority.
Lawyers should be abundantly wary of grounding any claim of professional
monopoly of economic opportunity on their superior moral character and
commitment to an ethical system more demanding than that of the common
man. While in any fair system of justice the misdeeds of the few can never
serve to convict the many- guilt by association- still, as a matter of public
relations and public attitudes, the forced resignation of the President of the
United States and the felony indictments of the Attorney General and the
chief domestic adviser to the President, all prominent lawyers, have left
visible and costly scars in the aggregate hides of the legal profession. Apart
from the sequelae of the 'Watergate trauma, the unwisdom of relying on the
loftiness of one's own ethical commitment compared to that of the general
70. E.g., State ex rel. Millkr v. St. Louis Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 74 S.W.2d 348 (1934).
71. E.g., In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).
72. R. Psvc. & P. U.S.T.C. 200 (1974), 60 T.C. 1152 (1973).
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run of mankind has been subjected to trenchant comment unrivaled during
the entire Christian era:
10. Two men went up into the temple to pray; the one a Pharisee,
the other a publican.
11. The Pharisee stood and prayed thus with himself, God, I
thank thee, that I am not as other men are, extortioners, unjust,
adulterers, or even as this publican.
12. I fast twice in the week, I give tithes of all that I possess.
13. And the publican, standing afar off, would not lift up so much
as his eyes unto heaven, but smote upon his breast, saying, God be
merciful to me a sinner.
14. I tell you, this man went down to his house justified rather than
the other: for every one that exalteth himself shall be abased; and
he that humbleth himself shall be exalted.3
To the credit of the legal profession it ought to be noted that apart from
the somewhat strained posturings required by the logic of the unauthorized
practice doctrines, lawyers do not make any serious claims of moral superiority
to nonlawyers.
In light of these comments on the rationale of the principles underlying
the unauthorized practice rules, further consideration of the result and what
74
reasoning there is in the case of Oregon State Bar v. John H. Miller & Co.
is in order. First, the seller of insurance in that case was not in any conceivable
manner involved with any litigation on behalf of his prospects. There was
no invasion of the lawyer's litigation turf. Nor did the seller of insurance ever
lay pen to paper to produce a will, trust agreement, or even a deed of gift.
No dispositive documents of any sort were drawn by the respondent. His
company did solicit members of the public for the purposes of advising them
for a fee with respect to the postmortem financial consequences of their estate
plans or absence of estate plans. One can infer that the advice consisted
largely of a forecast of federal estate tax, state death tax, probate expenses,
and the possibility of reducing them by means of the creation and funding
of inter vivos trusts, all in the context of the desirability of buying life insurance to provide for the cash needs of the prospect's estate. No claim was
made that the respondent misled or misadvised his potential customers, or
that he harmed them in any way. Indeed, for all that appears, he may have
done all of them, and their wives and children, a power of good. The marketing
of life insurance is a lawful and beneficial business, approved and partially
regulated by the states. The need for life insurance as a component of any
person's estate plan, and therefore its value and attractiveness to that person
usually depends on the nature and amount of his property, the people he
must provide for, and the prospective need to make undesired liquidations
of estate property to meet administrative expenses and death taxes. These
considerations are unique to each person. To tell an insurance man that he
cannot explore his prospect's real need for insurance and base a sales approach
on it because doing so involves some knowledge of law and tax matters seems
73. Luke 18:10-14 (King James).
74. 235 Ore. 341, 385 P.2d 181 (1963).
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to be taking hold of the pig by the wrong ear. If there is legitimate concern
with the integrity, training, and fitness of insurance men to do what they
actually do, the answer should be to establish licensing standards to insure
that they are competent to carry on their limited legal function in somewhat
the same way that optometrists and podiatrists are permitted to carry on a
limited medical and surgical practice in competition, to some degree, with
licensed physicians, who do not seem to worry much about the whole position.
Arguably the considerations just discussed are applicable to an unauthorized practice controversy involving a financial adviser who is not and
does not pretend to be a lawyer, but who has some demonstrable qualifications
to do what he does, and who is engaged in a lawful business and performs
his advisory function in good faith. There are even stronger reasons for contending that many of the cases that have condemned and excoriated unauthorized practice by trust companies are a bit wide of the mark.
A fair number of the administrative, as opposed to investment, tax, or
operations trust officers of any trust company will be lawyers admitted to
practice in the place where the trust company carries on its business. They are
the people who are principally in contact with the donors, beneficiaries, and
prospective donors whom the company serves. They are also the classmates
of the attorneys engaged in private practice in the region, and they sit alongside the attorneys in private practice at the continuing legal education programs on trust, probate, and tax law. They belong to the local and state
bar associations and serve on their probate, trust, and tax committees. The
same court admitted them to practice and stands ready to reprimand, suspend,
or disbar them. When an ethical violation is laid at the door of a person admitted to practice, grievance committees will not listen to the defense that
the respondent is not actively engaged in the private practice of law.73 The
trust officer-attorney is just as much subject to the professional standards of
conduct and policing committees of the bar and courts as any other attorney.
Therefore, the first four reasons for prohibiting the unauthorized practice of
law7 6 have no real relevance concerning the activities of a trust company
carried on by its attorney trust officers.
The fifth reason stated above 77 suggests the perhaps likely possibility
that a salaried attorney would betray his and his employer's client in having
to choose between the interest of the client and the corporate employer. This
is given as a reason for holding that the rendition of legal services by a
corporation staffed by attorneys is unauthorized practice. Such an argument
is a conjuring up of imaginary demons. A trust company, duly authorized
by its charter and the sovereign creating it to exercise trust powers, does not
deal with its trust customers at arm's length. Treachery to customers is not
only uncharacteristic of trust institutions but also fanciful speculation; such
treachery would be a breach of its enforceable fiduciary duty. Trust companies,
like all other fiduciaries, are bound by Cardozo's famous description of
fiduciary obligation:
75.
76.
77.

E.g., In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 97 A.2d 621 (1953).
See text accompanying note 68 supra.
See text accompanying note 70 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss4/3

16

Hyrne: Unauthorized Practice in Estate Planning and Administration: A Mi
1977"[

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE IN ESTATE PLANNING

Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a
tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity
has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine
the rule of undivided
loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of
8
particular exceptions7
Courts have been able to apply this demanding standard of conduct to lay
persons and organizations for centuries. Indeed, it can be inferred from the
Code of Professional Responsibility that one reason for the rigorous standard
of loyalty of an attorney to his client is that the attorney-client relationship
is a fiduciary one.7 9 It should also be observed that if the helplessness of a
salaried attorney in the grip of his employer is a badge of possible treachery
to the client, every attorney in a law firm subject to the control of senior
partners is a potential victim of such pressure. There is just as much or as
little reason to suppose that a managing partner will compel a junior to
betray a client as there is to suppose that a senior bank administrator will
compel a trust officer to violate the bank's fiduciary duty.
One of the most sensitive issues in the unauthorized practice struggle in
probate law is what might be called the issue of alleged comparative venality.
The theory assumes that a business corporation suffers a fatal inability to
engage in the practice of law even if it employs qualified practitioners because
its lay owners would be motivated principally by sordid considerations of
corporate gain and profit, whereas lawyers engaged in private practice are
motivated principally by love of justice. In formulating the theory courts
have hurled the challenge of comparative venality into the teeth of the lay
entrepreneurial class. On the other hand, Richard V. Wellman, chief reporter
for the Uniform Probate Code, has suggested that it was in appreciable
measure the widespread public suspicion that a conspiracy existed among
courts, legislatures, and lawyers to rob survivors of their inheritances that
led to the birth of the Uniform Probate Code.8 0 As is now well known, one
of the objects of the begetters of the Code8' was to provide for the nonjudicial
administration of decedent estates. Under the Uniform Probate Code as it
was conceived, proceedings to admit a will to probate, to secure the appointment of a personal representative, and to administer and close the estate
can all be informal and nonadjudicadve. 82 Its intention and effect is to permit
the administration of estates without the necessity of hiring a lawyer for that

78. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
79. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 8, EC 8-1.
80. Wellman, The New Uniform Probate Code, 56 A.B.A.J. 636 (1970).
81. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the American Bar Association drafted the
Code.
82. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§8-102, 3-103; art. III, parts 3 & 4. See also Wellman,
supra note 80, at 638.
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purpose.8 3 The authors of the Code intended to avoid the effect of cases
such as State ex rel. Baker v. County Court. 4 The court in that case held
that actions such as submission of a final account, application to determine
inheritance tax, and for final judgment by an executor who was the son
of the testatrix constituted the practice of law forbidden to any fiduciary
who was not an attorney.83 The notion was that the executor was not acting
in his own behalf, but was representing the beneficiaries of the estate and
therefore was plying a lawyer's craft. An application for mandamus to compel
the county judge to accept his filings was refused. 86 The executor's action
was confessedly taken because he had discharged the attorneys of the estate,
valued at $172,000, after hearing that their fee would be $4,800.8 - In spite
of the displacement in Wisconsin of the Baker case by the Uniform Probate
Code's provision for out-of-court, no-lawyer estate administration, the more
conservative courts have been captivated by Baker. Especially in Florida it
fell on receptive ears. The Second District Court of Appeal held that a husband
acting as executor under his wife's will could not administer her estate without
counsel since there were other legatees. 88 Indeed it appeared that even the
possible existence of creditors of the estate would prevent such unassisted
administration.9 The court gave a very restrictive interpretation to the case
of State ex rel. Falkner v. Btanton,90 in which a one sentence per curiam
opinion had held that a personal representative may represent himself in
probate proceedings as long as he remains the sole interested party. Judge
Alan R. Schwartz, dissenting in Jeffress, argued in vain that Falkner required
at least a trial on the issue of whether one applying for administration
without an attorney is indeed the "sole interested party." 91 The new Florida
Rules of Probate and Guardianship Procedure provide:
Every guardian and every personal representative, unless the personal
representative remains the sole interested party therein, shall be
represented by an attorney admitted to practice in this state. If the
guardian or personal representative is an attorney admitted to practice
in this state, he may represent himself as guardian or personal
2
representative.

Needless to say, the version of the Uniform Probate Code adopted by
Florida" does not provide for nonjudicial administration of decedent estates
except in limited cases. 94
83.

Comment, Informal Administration of Decedents' Estates in Wisconsin, 1974 Wis.

L. REv. 581.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

29 Wis. 2d 1, 138 N.W.2d 162 (1965).
Id. at 8, 138 N.W.2d at 167.
Id. at 19, 138 N.W.2d at 172.
Id. at 3, 138 N.W.2d at 164.
In re Estate of Jeffress, :301 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974).

89. Id. at 26.
90. 297 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1974).
91. 301 So. 2d at 26 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
92. FLA. R.P. & G.P. §5.030(b); In re Florida Rules of Probate and Guardianship Procedure, 324 So. 2d 38, 42 (Fla. 1975).

93.

FLA. STAT. chs. 731-735 (1975).
FLA. STAT. §§735.101, .103,

94. Id. See

.107 (1975), which provide for "Family Administra-
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Baker, Falkner, and Jeffress were all cases challenging the traditional rule
that no one may enter the probate court without a private attorney in charge
of the proceeding. The rule has been sustained in court. In Baker, members
of the American Bar Association Committee on Unauthorized Practice filed
an amicus curiae brief. On the other hand, the ABA Section on Real Property,
Trust and Probate Law, in creating the Uniform Probate Code, along
with the House of Delegates, in approving the Code, 95 have strengthened
the hand of the lay fiduciary who wants to do it himself.
A LoOK

TO THE FuTuRE

Maybe the first Dawn Man who discovered he had the power of speech
opened the history of language by saying to his cavemate, "Good buddy, we
live in an age of transition." Adam is believed to have said much the same
thing to Eve at the time of their expulsion from the Garden. Regardless of
when the cliche was coined, the beacons of change are flashing now as never
before with a portent exciting to some, dismaying to others. The Supreme
Court of the United States on June 16, 1975, held unlawful under section
one of the Sherman Act those bar association minimum fee schedules that
do what fee schedules are supposed to do: establish a price floor for the
furnishing of legal services. 98
On February 17, 1976, after what the New York Times described as a
long and acrimonious session 97 the bitterly divided House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association acted under pressure of law suits and approved
changes in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 98 The net effect of the
changes will be to permit lawyers to have display ads in telephone directory
yellow pages, as well as ads in other less accessible places stating, among
other matters, the lawyer's specialty (if permitted under state law), whether
the lawyer would accept credit cards or other credit arrangements, hours of
availability, a statement of fees for initial consultation, and the availability
of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of a fee for a particular service. 99
Not content with the extent to which the traditional rule against advertising
by lawyers was relaxed by the ABA's February 1976 amendments, the Department of Justice brought an action in federal district court.0 0 The complaint alleged that the ABA had engaged in a conspiracy with "various
persons and organizations" unreasonably to restrain interstate commerce by
tion," an abbreviated form of probate administration applicable to certain estates having
a gross value of less than $60,000. Furthermore, §735.301 provides for release from administration of estates consisting only of personal property the value of which does not
exceed exempt property, preferred funeral expenses. and expenses of last illness.
95. See Wellman, supra note 80, at 636.
96. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
97. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1976, at 13.
98. House Broadens Code's "Publicity in General" Rules at Midyear Meeting in
Philadelphia,62 A.B.A.J. 470 (1976).
99. ABA CoDE oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-102(A)(5) &(6).
100. United States v. American Bar Ass'n, No. 76-1182 (D.D.C., filed June 25, 1976). See
Justice Department Charges Code Advertising Provisions Violate Federal Antitrust Laws,
62 A.B.A.J. 979 (1976). See note 124 infra.
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championing a Code of Professional Responsibility that prohibited lawyers
from engaging in price advertising, thereby depriving the public of the
benefit of price competition among lawyers. The unthinkable has thus been
considered; the unsayable has been put into words.
These astounding events and others like them can be expected to produce
new challenges in the traditional rules that courts have more or less automatically applied to unauthorized practice cases. The results of the challenges
remain unknown.
The Scrivener's Function
Scrivening is likely to remain the proprietary turf of the lawyer in private
practice. With the possible exception of poets, there is no body of persons
whose academic training and day-to-day activities demand such expertise in
the meaning and use of words, sentences, paragraphs, and entire compositions.
From the time the student reads his first case in law school until he closes
his office door for the last time, he is vitally (and especially monetarily) concerned with the meaning and probable effect of what he or somebody else
has written in a deed, contract, will, trust, statute, opinion, article, or text.
From the breadth of his experience with many clients and many situations
both in and out of court, the attorney in private practice bit by bit over the
years forges the internal equipment that enables him, better than others, to
produce the will or trust or related document that is not only internally consistent and calculated to produce the result that the client wants but also
takes into account all of the statutes, cases, and tax regulations that will bear
on the performance of its terms. The more responsible of those who might
feel some temptation to run up a will or trust instrument from time to time,
such as insurance agents and bankers, are basically aware of the civil liabilities
imposed by the courts on those who undertake a job beyond their powers
and then do it defectively. They probably will be content to leave the malpractice risk, along with the compensation, to the private practitioner with
his unique skills and his malpractice insurance policy.
The Counselor'sFunction
When the effect of the changes of attitude now being demonstrated in
the cases and bar association brouhahas has been felt in state courts, there
is likely to be some change in the views currently held as to what is an
appropriate function for those performing estate planning and estate administration. Some people may seek out life insurance salesmen and request
an opportunity to purchase their wares. If insurance companies had to
depend on such people, it would hardly be the profitable industry we know
it to be. Most life insurance is sold by salesmen who take the initiative and
approach the prospect. For such salesmen to practice their art, they must be
able to convince the prospect that he needs what they have to offer. This
cannot be done by a recitation of such generalities as the present cases leave
as the lawful equipment of the insurance salesman. What the prospect wants
to know (or perhaps, after employment of the salesman's art, can be interested
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in) is what the insurance means to him, to his family, and to his property
at the time of his death. If the nonlawyer insurance agent's advice and
counsel about the effect of death taxes, income taxes, wills, trusts, and estate
administration are reasonably evoked by and related to the prospect's inquiries prior to deciding whether he will do business with the insurance man,
the result of a case such as Miller 0' will be hard to sustain. The court in
that case disposed of the contentions of insurance men as follows:
Much of the advice contained in the report to the client could not
be given without an understanding of various aspects of the law,
principally the law of taxation. Most of the advice is in terms of "suggestions." In each instance the client is urged to consult his own attorney.
But whether the report takes the form of suggestions for further study
or as a recommendation that the suggestions be subjected to further
scrutiny by a lawyer, the fact remains that the client receives advice
from defendants and the advice involves the application of legal
principles. This constitutes the practice of law.
Defendants contend that they employ the law in essentially the
same manner as many types of businesses which require the understanding and application of legal principles by those who are not admitted to the bar, as for example, the architect who advises a prospective
builder that a proposed structure does not conform to the applicable
building code, or the travel agent who advises his customer of passport
requirements. It must be conceded that frequently advice given in the
course of carrying on a business is shaped by a knowledge of the
applicable law. But the giving of such advice is not in every instance
regarded as the practice of law. The legal ingredient in the advice
may be so insubstantial as to call for the application of the principle
of de minimis non curat lex. This is not to say that we adopt the view
permitting the practice of law where the legal element is merely incidental to the business activity being carried on. To fall outside the
proscription of the statute the legal element must not only be incidental,
it must be insubstantial. It cannot be said that one who plans 1another
02
person's estate employs the law only in an insubstantial way.
In the court's view, an insurance man's discussion of the effect of taxes and
the probate process on the devolution of property is forbidden because it
constitutes the practice of law and because the legal element of his sales
effort cannot be said to be insubstantial. The court's opinion is not a reasoned
statement that the tangible and overriding public interest requires that
the insurance salesman close his mouth. Rather it is a fiat, an ipse dixit.103
101. For a discussion of the case, see text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
102. 235 Ore. at 344-45, 385 P.2d at 182.
103. Discussing the paucity of legal reasoning in the Miller case (even though it was a
cause cO.1tbre that attracted the very able participation of the members of the Unauthorized

Practice of Law Committee of the ABA as amici curiae) a commentator noted: "The decision
in the principal case would have been more acceptable had the court squarely faced several

questions which should be asked in all such cases. For example: Can the lay services
be given in the public interest? Taking into account such factors as cost, time, expertise,

responsibility, business ethics, possible conflicts of interest and need for individual service,
is the work better done by an attorney or a layman? Perhaps the decision in the principal

case may be justified. Unfortunately the court did not present adequate reasoning for
its holding." 43 ORE. L. REv. 171, 177 (1964) (emphasis added).
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But if enough public pressure exists to move the Department of Justice to
lock horns with the American Bar Association on the issue of the genuine
freedom of the lawyer to advertise his wares, the same pressure will ultimately
lead to a reexamination of the lawyer's monopoly over the most public of
public property- the law of the land. The same observation can be made
of the counseling function of the trust company and the trust officer. If
the lawful pursuit of a lawful business involves the entrepreneur in an incidental discussion of legal matters with his customer or prospect, it is reasonable to think that the shift in attitudes observed earlier may vindicate the
position of the entrepreneur.
The Author's Function
Little need be said here. The amusing episode of the Dacey cases10 4 in
New York has established, probably for good, the proposition that any author
and any publisher are free to publish textbooks and form books on legal
subjects. If, however, what is ostensibly publication is actually a mail-order
peddling of irresponsible legal advice or misrepresented legal equipment
whose use is demonstrably likely to lead to bad results, the courts of the
future, like those of the past and present, doubtlessly will use their process
to suppress the practice.(1° 5
The Corporate Fiduciary'sFunction
What has already been said about the counselor's function in connection
with the insurance industry is equally applicable to the role of the trust
company and its trust officers, with the additional consideration that in most
trust companies the trust officers are usually attorneys admitted to the bar
of the state in which the trust company does business. What insurance salesmen ought to be able to do in the pursuit of insurance business, the trust
Essentially the same criticism was made in a case note at 13 DE

PAUL

L. REV. 330 (1964).

On the other hand, the court found support in the traditionally oriented case note at 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 364 (1964), where the writer set forth the traditional view of the role of the
lawyer as the sole permissible adviser in estate planning.
104. See text accompanying notes 38-51 supra.
105. In the litigation involving the recently popular business of composing and
publishing do-it-yourself divorce kits, it has been judicially recognized that an essential
element of an unauthorized practice case against a layman-author-publisher is that he
not only publish legal material but also enter into some sort of pseudo attorney-client relationship with his customers. Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Ore. 552, 538 P.2d 913
(1975). For a discussion of this point, see Note, Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist: The Legality
of Unauthorized Practice, DET. COL. L. REv. 293 (1976). On the other hand, a layman was
enjoined in Texas from selling simple will forms to the public. Palmer v. Unauthorized
Practice Comm., 438 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971). Apparently, there was nothing
wrong with the forms themselves, as far as they went, and the author did no consulting.
The ground for the injunction was that the publication could lead the public to believe
that "all testamentary dispositions might be thus standardized." Id. at 376. It has been
argued that this case suppre,sed constitutionally protected speech. Case Note, AttorneyClient - Unauthorized Practice of Law - Selling Will Forms by a Layman Through News-

paper Advertising, 2 TEx. TECH. L. REy. 281 (1971).
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company and its salaried attorneys ought to be able to do in pursuit of
trust business.
The more sensitive question with respect to the unauthorized practice by
trust companies is whether their access to the probate court for the purpose of
administering estates, trusts, and guardianships in their capacity as fiduciaries
should depend on the extent to which they employ attorneys in private practice
to represent them. As has been shown, there is substantial authority that
salaried attorney-trust officers employed by trust companies are eligible to
prepare and file documents and make appearances in the probate court
with respect to executorships, guardianships, and trusteeships being discharged by their corporate employers. 10 Other courts have refused to go
this far by not recognizing the fact that salaried attorneys are subject to the
same supervision and have met the same professional requirements as their
brethren in the law offices. Some trust customers have even voiced the
suspicion that the requirement that trust companies employ attorneys in
private practice for the administration of estates amounts to the use of bar
association muscle to force the performance (and occasionally the nonperformance) of unneeded legal work. When journalistic polemicists set out to
attack the legal profession, they aim their heaviest salvos at probate practice
and the fees charged for probate work.-7z Candor compels the admission that,
whether strident or reasonable, some of the complaints of abuses in this
part of law practice are justified. As noted earlier, Richard Wellman, an
eminent academic probate specialist, has stated that the informal administration provisions of the Uniform Probate Code are directed at precisely this
problem. 08 Trust officers are, in the main, expert probate and trust attorneys
as well as responsible business executives who occupy a post of fiduciary
accountability. They should be in a position to decide whether the administration of a particular estate can be done by bank personnel on a strictly
routine basis or whether tax or legal problems require the expert attention
of outside counsel for proper disposition. Out of respect for their professional
qualifications, the state's decision to grant trust powers to their employers,
the annual state and federal examinations that they must pass, and the
public acceptance and approval that permits them to stay in business, trust
officers should be granted the benefit of a prima facie presumption that in a
given situation they will do the intelligent and honorable thing rather
than the stupid and corrupt thing. If they do act stupidly and corruptly,
the courts will hold them to a stern accounting, and the solvency of the
trust company always gives the complainant a real rather than theoretical
remedy.
The Impact of New Interpretationsof the Sherman Act
Upon Traditional Views of Unauthorized Practice by Corporate Fiduciaries
Since the services of bank trust departments are delivered by trust officers,
106.
107.

See note 64 supra.
M. BLOoM, THE TROUBLE WrrH LAwPras 203-16 (1968).

108. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
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many of whom are attorneys, the Goldfarb case 1°9 and the Justice Department's
antitrust proceeding against the ABA"0 warn of drastic new positions that
the Attorney General of the United States and the courts may take concerning
the relations between the bar and the banking business, among others.
The ABA has adopted as an effective way of coping with the unauthorized
practice problem, as it perceives it, the process of securing agreements with
lay groups engaged in allied professions and businesses by which the bar
and the lay groups agree to stay out of each other's territories. Such agreements, called Statements of Principles,"' have been entered into by the ABA
separately with the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, The
Trust Division of the American Bankers Association, the National Association of Life Underwriters, the National Association of Real Estate Boards,
and others. These Statements of Principles are supervised by national conference groups composed jointly of lawyers and representatives of the other
professions and businesses involved, with a view to giving the agreements the
most extensive effectiveness possible.' 1 2 The Statement of Principles approved
jointly by the ABA and the American Bankers Association" 3 consists largely
of a detailed elaboration of acts constituting the practice of law and a detailed
statement that banks will not, by drafting instruments, administering estates,
making biased recommendation of counsel, advertising, derogating the
attorney's function, or otherwise counseling customers, intrude upon the
professional area of the attorney as it is fixed by local law. Trust companies
are permitted to engage the attorney who drew the instrument or who
represented the testator or donor as attorney of record for purposes of estate
or trust administration. The view has been expressed that the processes of
discussion and negotiation involved in the joint conference approach have
proved fruitful and effective in confining lawyers and others in allied pursuits
within their proper bounds in most instances, with judicial measures necessary
only in cases of the most stubborn recalcitrance."1 Certainly, in Winston
Churchill's phrase, "jaw, jaw is better than war, war." Nonetheless, there are
grounds for skepticism about the accommodation and symbiosis said to have
been accomplished by the Statements of Principles."Those laymen (accountants, bankers, architects, and chartered life under109.
110.

See text accompanying note 96 supra.
See note 100 supra and accompanying text.

111.

6 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 71C (1977).

112. Boodell, The Conference Approach and Statements of Principles, 28 UNATrTH.
PRAC. NEWS 335 (1962-1963).
113.

6 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 72C (1977).

114. See Boodell, supra note 82. Much the same view was expressed by attorney
Robert Hetlage, accountant Bernard Barnett, life underwriter Roland Maycock, and trust
officer William Latimer at a symposium presented to the National Conference of Bar Presidents on February 5, 1971. 36 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEWs 1 (1971).
115. Although the persons most closely involved with the lay groups with whom
Statements of Principles have been adopted do not harp on this note, a very short
period of reflection makes it clear that there is a direct relationship between the submissiveness of the lay groups and the rigidity of the judicial decisions that have enjoined,
restrained, and convicted them from time to time. Without such cases, the Statements of

Principles would probably amount to little.
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writers) who participate on behalf of their respective groups are well
established practitioners at the apex of their respective callings, and themselves probably under far less economic pressure to offer a challenge to the
legal profession than the more sparsely blessed infantrymen in the trenches.
To what extent the former actually speak for the latter is open to question,
as well as the extent to which the yeoman realtor, banker, or life underwriter
feels bound by the commitments of the joint conferees of his own calling. The
Huntington Bank case"O6 and the Connecticut Bank case" 7 both arose long
after the Statement of Principles on Banks with Trust Functions was first
promulgated in 1941."1 Likewise the adoption of the Statement of Principles
on Realtors in 1942 did not prevent the lawyer-realtor brangle in Arizona
in 1962, the ultimate outcome of which was terribly damaging to the bar
in terms of impairing its public image." 9
In the trust business a bank that has been nominated executor or trustee
under a will customarily appoints the scrivener of that will as its attorney
of record upon the death of the testator. That custom has been hardened into
a policy by the Statement of Principles. 20 The effect is that the fiduciary
that is nominally in control of the administration of the estate or trust by
virtue of the testator's appointment can find itself linked with an attorney,
not necessarily of its choosing, whom it cannot discharge without a public
fight and to whom, for practical purposes, it surrenders a substantial measure,
if not all, of its decisionmaking power as a fiduciary. This result is not
necessarily what the testator had in mind when he designated the bank as his
executor.
The Department of Justice in filing its antitrust suit against the ABA"'
has taken the position that free and open competition in the sale of legal
services by the exercise of an untrammeled right to advertise is in the public
interest and is a right to which the public is entitled under the Sherman
Act. 22 Having thereby taken its chances with the offense of lMse majesty in
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See text accompanying notes 53-60 supra.
See text accompanying note 4 supra.
6 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAw DmIcroRY 72C (1977).
See note 125 infra.
See Paragraph V of the Declaration of Policies, 6

MARTINDA E-HUBBELL

LAW

DmcroRY 72C (1977).

121. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
122. Paragraphs V and VI of the complaint, as printed in 62 A.BA.J. 980 (1976), are
as follows:

"VW.

Violation Alleged
"8. For many years past, and continuing up to and including the date of the filing
of this complaint, the defendant and co-conspirators have been engaged in a combinatioin
and conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of the aforesaid trade and commerce in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Said unlawful combination and conspiracy is continuing
and will continue unless the relief hereinafter prayed for is granted.
"9. The aforesaid combination and conspiracy has consisted of a continuing agreement,
understanding and concert of action among the defendant and co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which have been and are:
(a) That the defendant adopt, publish and distribute a Code of Professional
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raising its hand to the Code of Professional Responsibility, is there an
insurance company bold enough to indemnify the legal profession against
the chance that the Attorney General might decide that the Statements of
Principles are also violations of the Sherman Act? If the dominating concept
is the right of the public to the most economical services in the administration of estates, it could probably be demonstrated that, but for the Statements
of Principles and the cases that give them teeth, many banks, with their
attorney-trust officers, would stand ready to administer estates without employing and paying outside counsel and without charging for their own
legal services, except when in their judgment the complexity of issues arising
in administration compel such employment. Might not this kind of a showing
in the suit filed by the Department of Justice indicate a forbidden stifling of
competition by the Statements? If it be objected that the Sherman Act cannot
apply to the defense by lawyers of the turf recognized as their own by state
law, it can be replied that the plaintiffs in Goldfarb123 survived the objection
to the rule of Parker v.

2
Brown'j 4

and later prevailed. It is true that in

Goldfarb the authority prescribing the minimum fee schedule was the local
bar association and the enforcing authority was the state bar association,
neither of which was the state within the rule of Parker. But does anybody
suppose that the minimum fee schedule could have survived merely by being
Responsibility containing provisions prohibiting lawyers from engaging in price advertising
and other advertising about the availability and cost of legal services;
(b) That the members o1 the ABA abide by said provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;
(c) That the defendant and co-conspirators police said provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
"10. For the purpose of effectuating the aforesaid combination and conspiracy, the
defendant and co-conspirators have done those things which, as hereinbefore alleged, they
agreed to do.
"VI.
Effects
"11. The aforesaid combination and conspiracy has had the following effects, among
others:
(a) Price competition in the provision of legal services has been restrained;
(b) Purchasers and potential purchasers of legal services have been deprived of the
opportunity to obtain information about the cost and availability of legal services;
(c) Purchasers of legal services have been deprived of the benefits of free and open
competition in the sale of such services;
(d) Lawyers have been restrained in their ability to make legal services readily and
fully available to consumers."
123. See text accompanying notes 96 & 109 supra.
124. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The force of the argument, however, is limited by the recent
Supreme Court decision Bates v. State Bar, 45 U.S.L.W. 4895 (1977). In Bates, decided after
this article was written, the majority declared that the Arizona disciplinary rule restricting
the practice of law was not subject to a Sherman Act attack. Dissenting Justices Powell,
Stewart, and Rehnquist agreed that the antitrust claim was barred. Id. at 4905 (Powell &
Stewart, JJ., dissenting), 4909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Applying the Parker state-action
exemption, the majority distinguished Goldfarb and Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579 (1976). Unlike the minimum fee schedule in Goldfarb, the advertising restraint in
Bates was "the affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court." 45 U.S.L.W. at 4898.
The Court emphasized that the disciplinary rule clearly reflected state policy concerning
professional behavior and was subject to supervision by the state supreme court. Id.
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blessed by a state court? In view of the actual influence exercised over state
courts by bar associations in the area of fees, passing such a schedule under
the seal of the local court so as to give it Sherman Act immunity as state
action would seem too easy a device to take in the Supreme Court of the
United States. The Department of Justice has come out flat-footed for the
proposition that freedom of lawyers to advertise publicly, until now the
badge of shysterism, not only is permissible but is actually an enforceable
legal right of the public. It is very probable that this challenge to an ancient
axiom will survive and beget its own presently unforseeable progeny.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing positions and opinions may vary considerably with those
held by most of the practicing bar. The observations are offered temperately,
with reasonably good grace and humor, and a readiness always to admit
that there can be not only good faith but reason on the other side. Inasmuch
as I have only half-facetiously ventured to forecast future developments,
only the future will tell if I have made any lucky prophecies. In the long
run the legal profession will not thrive and prosper by indicting, prosecuting,
convicting, enjoining, and issuing orders to show cause to those laymen and
lay organizations that, in their ordinary day to day business, are involved
with people and the law.12 The legal profession will thrive and prosper if,
by its deeds, it can cause a now skeptical public to believe, that it has
something more and better to offer than even the best-intentioned amateur.
To those who will reject my views and arguments out of hand, I ask only
that you keep in mind:
[When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth 26
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can
1
be carried out.
125.

The most sobering incident encountered in researching this article occurred in

Arizona in 1962. The supreme court of that state had decided State Bar v. Arizona Land
Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961), modified on rehearing, 91 Ariz. 293,

371 P.2d 1020 (1962). On the ground of unauthorized practice, the court enjoined title
companies and real estate brokers from performing forty-five different acts that they had
long regarded as being in their rightful province. The response of the realtors was to
get 107,420 signatures on an initiative petition to amend the Arizona constitution to
provide that a licensed broker or salesman for a party to a sale, exchange, or trade of
real estate, should have the right to draft all instruments relating to the transaction. A
spirited campaign followed, featuring bumper stickers (for the Bar, "Save the Constitution,"

and for the realtors, "Protect Your Pocketbook"), telephone calls, pamphlets, and newspaper, magazine, radio, and television advertising. On election day, November 6, 1962, the
realtor-sponsored amendment passed with a popular vote of 224,177 for the amendment,
61,316 against. Less than 22% of those voting cast a ballot favorable to the lawyers. See
Marks, The Lawyers and the Realtors: Arizona's Experience, 49 A.BA.J. 139 (1963).
126. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 639 (1919) (quoting Holmes, J.).
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